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In the ambiguous legislative climate synonymous with authoritarianism, the Egyptian state has 
encouraged the commodification of land and property through a raft of different policies that 
have deregulated the market, driving up the prices in some places sixteen-fold over the last decade 
alone. State-led commodification in tandem with informal tenure for most Egyptians has meant the 
exploitation of many communities by a plethora of government and quasi-government agencies that 
claim their land as their own.
Through three different tenure cases lodged by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) 
over the last four years, this paper will show how a pattern exists between state-led commodification 
and informal/insecure tenure. The case studies show the official use of direct methods of eviction 
such as eviction orders, sequestration decrees, and the falsifying of contracts. In addition, unofficial 
indirect methods of forced eviction have been used, such as cutting off power and water supplies, as 
well as the intimidation and torture of some residents.
The paper will also show how many of the forced evictions have happened, or been attempted, in 
the shadow of seemingly social motives like “upgrading unsafe areas,” “the public good,” or simply 
labelling the residents as “usurpers” and “squatters.”
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Roots of Informal/Insecure Tenure: A Legal Labyrinth
A 1997 study revealed that 92% of property in Egypt is unregistered, and most 
of this could never be registered as a consequence of decades of  informality.1 
Formal legal tenure was not sought in most cases because of complex 
and  protracted steps to register property, which could include seventy-
seven bureaucratic procedures and take between six and fourteen years to 
 complete.2 The study also identified a staggering nine typologies of tenure and 
divided them into two groups: buildings of informal origin and, more intrigu-
ingly, buildings of formal origin (Fig. 1).
While some claim that not all of the residents living informally are at con-
stant risk of being evicted, as complicity between residents and key officials 
has bought some amnesty,3 informal tenure has made it easy for government 
agencies to evict residents from a property whenever deemed necessary and 
where public backlash would be minimal. It is estimated that over 42,000 
families have been subject to relocation in Egypt over the last fifteen years due 
to so-called urban upgrading projects alone.4 A large portion of these reloca-
tions amount to forced eviction, as little or no consultation took place, while 
over half have been relocated to housing outside the city.5 These statistics 
do not include other forms of eviction, such as those related to expropria-
tion orders, squatting on state-owned land, and the falling of original formal 
tenure into informality due to a number of factors including inheritance com-
plications, changes in the law, or illegal transactions.
All three cases in this study represent tenure that started out formally and 
legally, but is now considered informal (see Table 1).
In Ramlet Bulaq residents have squatted uncontested for more than 
seventy years.6 Common Law allows for the possession of private land if it 
has not been contested in fifteen years,7 in this case land belonging to the 
industrial Kafrawy and ‘Ezawy families. However, the squatters never took 
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Figure 1. Typologies of informal tenure in Egypt according to DeSoto
their tenancy to court to formalise it, possibly because of the lack of belief in 
a court system that would cost them time and money they do not have, with 
a strong possibility that it would never be resolved.8 Indeed if straightforward 
registration of formal property takes an average of ten years to complete, how 
long would informal tenure take?
The farmers of ‘Ezbet al-‘Arab were given the right to own their land 
through the agrarian reform policies in the Arab Socialist era of the 1950s 
which nationalized large private land holdings, including that of the Awqaf 
(Religious Endowments).9 The Agrarian Reform Agency (ARA) redistributed 
the Khedieve’s Ismail Waqf in Alexandria to smallholders, registering most 
of the land with the Real Estate Tax Registry, though part of it was not fully 
registered.10 Within a decade the Awqaf was re-established, and law 80/1971 
stated that the ARA should reassign all land back to it. Two years later, law 
42/1973 amended that provision by stating that only land that was not redis-
tributed to smallholders would be reassigned back to the Awqaf. However, 
the Awqaf ignored the 1973 amendment and brought most of the Ismail Waqf 
back under its de facto jurisdiction. In 1975 it revoked most farmers’ ARA 
rent-to-own contracts and made out fixed term rental contracts.11
Employees of the state-owned Misr Spinning and Weaving Company 
(MSWC) received a small house or apartment in Mota’maret al-Mahalla 
funded through a profit- sharing scheme introduced in the 1950s during 
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Arab Socialist reforms, where a portion of the worker’s dividends would 
go to a housing fund.12 Once an employee was pensioned off, the MSWC 
would issue an eviction order which the employee would present to the local 
council and receive a council flat on a rent-to-own basis, jointly funded by 
the workers’ fund and the Gharbeyya Governorate. However, the MSWC 
claimed in the late 1990s that the housing fund had been depleted, and today 
750 retired workers and their families who received eviction orders do not 
have alternative housing and have continued to occupy the workers’ units. 
The MSWC has considered these residents as squatters and continued to file 
eviction orders and the courts continued to uphold them despite evidence 
being given that there is no alternative housing and ignoring any claim that 
the housing was in fact a shared ownership scheme and not owned by the 
MSWC.13
Table 1. Overview of the three Communities Covered in this Study
Communities Ramlet Bulaq, Cairo ‘Ezbet al-‘Arab, 
Alexandria
Mota’maret 
al-Mahalla, 
al-Gharbeyya
Number of 
families
500 + 234+ 750 +
Hostile state 
agencies
Cairo Governorate, 
Informal Settlements 
Development Facility 
(ISDF)
Al-Awqaf, Alexandria 
Governorate, 
Agrarian 
Reform Agency 
(ARA), housing 
cooperatives for state-
run agencies
Misr Spinning 
and Weaving 
Co. (MSWC), 
Gharbeyya Gov.
Residents’ 
claim
Legal though 
unformalised 
squatting for over 
ninety years on 
private land of 
absentee landlord.
Majority rent 
contracts with de 
facto landlord, the 
Awqaf.
Minority private 
ownership after 
completing lease-to-
own contract with the 
de jure landlord the 
ARA
Shared ownership of 
units that were built 
using the MSWC 
Workers’ Housing 
Fund on land owned 
by the Gharbeyya 
government in 
agreement.
Area of  
land (m2)
29,000 1,629,600 281,400
Estimated 
land value 
(US$ mn)
170 1,058 263
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Asset Management of State-Owned Agencies and a Deregulated 
Property Market 
In 1958 the state established two distinct types of public land: public state 
land and private state land, allowing state-owned agencies to trade and deal 
in the latter.14 This was at a time of Arab Socialism where the state owned 
businesses, and these businesses were allowed to trade and deal in public land. 
And so the law established that any vacant land in Egypt that has no legal 
owners, state or private, will be considered a national resource owned by the 
state and thus considered private state land.
This law had a number of consequences that would lay the groundwork 
for the three cases presented in this paper. The first was that it prohibited any 
adverse possession, traditional claims or otherwise, of land; thus, even though 
communities had put vacant land to use by squatting on it for decades, their 
claim would not be recognised if they squatted after 1942 (fifteen years prior 
to the new law), or had no documents to prove it.
Another consequence of the law was that publicly owned companies and 
agencies could sell state land under their jurisdiction to generate revenues for 
themselves, as private state land was considered an economic asset and could 
be sold, while public state land – mainly roads and canals – are considered 
public domain and cannot be sold.
With the shift from Arab Socialism to Neoliberalism in the second half of 
the 1970s, along with the fact that the Egyptian government is the country’s 
largest landowner through various state-owned agencies, government policy 
has constantly worked towards deregulating the property market in favour 
of driving land and property prices up, and thus boosting revenue for the 
state. Deregulation wasn’t a side-effect or a matter of neglect but “a con-
scious decision by authorities,” as lawyer and urban planner Peter Marcuse 
points out.15
A second shift towards further deregulation happened in 1996 when the 
government started a process of allowing foreign individuals and businesses 
to buy land and property in Egypt, where law 230/1996 was passed annul-
ling the very restrictive law 56/1988, though it also stipulated a number of 
limitations including a maximum limit of two units not exceeding 4,000 
meters each. It seems the new limitations were still too restrictive, so Prime 
Ministerial decree 248/2005 removed limitations on area and number of 
units in certain geographic areas – mainly the coastal tourism zones on the 
Mediterranean and Red Seas. 
Encouraged by the revenue of land sales on the coasts, where one auction 
netted 1 billion EGP alone,16 a milestone then, a further amendment in 2007 
removed almost all geographic restrictions on foreign landownership bar 
Sinai.17 Almost overnight, land prices spiked 116% in the suburb-like “New 
Cities” around Cairo, with a staggering average annual increase of 148% 
between 2003 and 2013.18 For FY 2015/2016, the New Urban Communities 
Authority (NUCA), the largest of Egypt’s urban landholders and which owns 
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and administers these so-called New Cities, announced it would generate 
EGP 50bn (US$ 5.9bn) from land sales alone.19 
While NUCA has been assigned mostly vacant state-owned desert land 
with the sole purpose of developing it, other state-owned enterprises that 
should be doing something else – managing local services, cultivating agri-
cultural land, or (shock-horror) manufacturing products – have sought to 
monetise land they claim jurisdiction over, land that is home to millions of 
Egyptians. Spurred on by the 1990s IMF and World Bank structural adjust-
ment policies, these agencies have gone on an ‘asset management’ spree 
in order to raise their value before being privatised, or used as collateral 
towards loans.
With the state budget deficit surging past 10%, in arguably one of its 
most concerted asset management moves to buttress state spending, the 
cabinet quietly established the Committee to Inventory Unused State Assets 
last October to “build a database of unused assets belonging to ministries, 
local government and the agencies affiliated with them, and establish a plan 
to utilise them in a manner that would realise the highest possible return.”20 
The committee emerged at a time when many government agencies had 
already started building databases of their own, including the Ministry of 
Water Resources,21 local governments such as Minya,22 or government-
owned agencies such as the state-run Egyptian Radio and Television Union 
(ERTU) whose main headquarters is in a prime area overlooking the Nile in 
Cairo.23
Many state-owned companies now even have their own real estate invest-
ment divisions to capitalise on their large landholdings or are in the process 
of setting them up. These include all the subsidiary companies within 
the Holding Company for Silos, Mills and Bakeries,24 Egypt National 
Railways’ ERJET, which identified over 45,000 acres that it seeks to 
 “re-utilise,”25  generating EGP 400mn this year alone,26 and the Agricultural 
Development and Lending Bank which controls EGP 4bn worth of assets.27 
The World Bank has played a role in setting up some of these companies, 
while it has asked outright for a full inventory of all land under the jurisdic-
tion of the Cairo Transport Authority (CTA) as a prerequisite for disbursing 
a loan.28
In the government’s desperation to raise cash, asset management has 
taken an even more sinister curve. An amendment to the ERTU’s by-law 
proposed by the Ministry of Planning would change the type of state land 
under the agency’s jurisdiction from public state land, since it was never a 
holding company, to private state land, where it could be sold on to private 
investors.29 Such a change is unprecedented, and if passed would be the 
first realization of the 2014 constitution which deleted the stipulation that 
described the public role of land, a realization that would allow virtually all 
land designated for public use, or expropriated for public benefit, to be sold 
off to investor/speculators. 
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Asset-Management and Informal Tenure: Exploiting the Rent Gap
With the selling off of a considerable portion of state-administered assets, 
especially assets with vague legal tenure and located in so-called prime areas 
of the city, the threat of forced eviction for millions looms large. 
The Cairo 2050/2052 plan to gentrify the more lucrative parts of Cairo, 
drawn up by the General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP) and 
Cairo Governorate, sought to capitalize on the state-induced property boom 
of the 2000s, where land prices of so-called prime locations on the river-
front in the heart of Cairo went up 44% a year over a decade.30 The Urban 
Development Plan for Rod al-Farag,31 part of the Cairo 2050/2052 plan, 
included the “demolition of unsafe shacks” and the relocation of residents 
in three “slum nodes” including ‘Ashwaeyat Nile Towers (i.e. Ramlet Bulaq) 
to housing estates in the New Cities outside Cairo or paying them compen-
sation (Fig. 2).32 According to a former head of the Informal Settlements 
Development Facility (ISDF), the Ramlet Bulaq project could net them EGP 
600mn (US$ 71mn).33 
As urban development spread informally over green field sites, large por-
tions of Awqaf administered agricultural land became prime land for real 
estate development, making the eviction of farmers and the developing 
or selling off the land lucrative. Farmers in ‘Ezbet al-‘Arab typically rent 
out an acre for EGP 2,000 (US$ 236) per year, netting the Awqaf a mere 
EGP 600,000 (US$ 71,000) from the 300 acre Muthalath parcel it does not 
legally own. In a dubious profit-sharing scheme between the Awqaf and the 
Alexandria Governorate,34 the latter would receive a third of the Muthalath 
Figure 2. Rendering of the Rod al-Farag Corniche in the Cairo 2050 Plan. Only the 
identical Nile City Towers on the right exist, behind them is Ramlet Bulaq.  
Source: GOPP
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in exchange for reassigning the land as part of the city limits, evicting the 
residents, demolishing any buildings on the land, and servicing the new subdi-
visions with infrastructure (Fig. 3), while the Awqaf stood to make EGP 6bn 
(US$ 706mn).35 The Awqaf has inventoried all of its land and recently was set 
to boost state revenue by selling off assets worth EGP 1.2bn (US$ 141mn) in 
one auction alone.36
Ever since law 203/1991 came in on the back of structural adjustment poli-
cies pushed through by the IMF and World Bank, the government has been 
trying to privatize state-owned companies, sometimes at bargain rates. The 
first attempt to privatize the MSWC in 2004 failed, as workers protested.37 A 
decline in production and a rise in debt, brought on by a lack of investment 
in the company, have recently led the Holding Company for Cotton Spinning 
and Weaving, which owns MSWC, to boost revenue through international 
restructuring consultants and inventorying its assets.38 Privatizing MSWC 
with hundreds of people living on its assets is not the best way to go, which 
may explain why it has demolished the homes it has been able to vacate 
as opposed to reassigning them to new employees (Fig. 3). But if MSWC 
doesn’t own the land, how would it profit? In 2009 a planned joint develop-
ment emerged in the press that MSWC and the Gharbeyya Governorate will 
build a 5448-unit commercial housing project in place of the Mosta’mara,39 a 
scheme that could be valued at EGP 1.6bn (US$ 188mn).
In all three communities, there was a considerable “rent-gap” between 
what it would cost the agencies to evict the residents and the market value 
Figure 3. Front-page ad published by the Awqaf calls for the intervention of the 
president in evicting the residents of some land plots in Muthalath al-Monntazah. At 
the top right is an image of the proposed urban subdivision plan.  
Al-Gumhureyya, November 11, 2014.
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of the land, a gap only possible because of the situation of informal tenure 
(Fig. 4). Officials in some negotiations with the residents of Ramlet Bulaq 
offered to pay them what would amount to EGP 2,000 per square meter, 
compared with the EGP 50,000 reported market value.40 In Muthalath al-
Montazah some residents accepted to sell their land for EGP 143 per meter, 
even though the Awqaf had sold similar plots at auction for EGP 3,000 per 
meter.41 Intriguingly, real estate developers operating in the area sell land for 
about EGP 10,000 per meter, leading to assumptions that some auctions by 
government agencies are rigged to be under-valued in favour of the private 
developers that buy land from them.
Mechanisms of Eviction: Writing Your Own Rule-Book
In all three cases, state agencies have used legal methods to evict, or attempt 
to evict, residents even though they had weak or no grounds to do so.
When the ISDF was set up in 2009 an amendment to the Expropriation 
Law 10/1990 was made allowing private land to be expropriated if it was 
deemed by the ISDF to be an unsafe area: the residents were in danger of 
natural disasters, building collapse, pollution, or insecure tenure.42 If the 
Figure 4. Rent-gap between what the government agencies may pay to buy out 
residents, the values they may sell the land on to private investors, and the estimated 
market value of the land. (EGP/m2)
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community was on state-owned land a simple eviction order could be issued. 
The ISDF also produced the National Map of “Unsafe” Areas that identified 
over 212,000 families living in such areas, 120,000 of which live informally on 
state-owned land.43 This policy seems to have been written for any governor 
wishing to get rid of shack dwellers, where a simple eviction order could be 
issued if the community was on state-owned land, or an expropriation decree 
would be issued if it was on private land.
The Cairo Governor did the latter when he issued temporary expropriation 
decree 8993/2011, basing it on a report by the ISDF that classified Ramlet 
Bulaq as a “Level 2 unsafe area.” Had it not been for a keen-eyed lawyer 
who noticed the sequestration decree in the official gazette, an appeal would 
not have been lodged.44 The appeal was eventually won, mostly on technical 
grounds where the Cairo Governorate was found to not have completed the 
formal steps to sequester the land.45 Had they done so, it would have been 
very hard for the appeal to have been won.
For both the Mosta’mara and the ‘Ezbet al-‘Arab cases, the MSWC and 
the Awqaf simply exploited vague or contradictory legislation. The MSWC 
benefitted from complacent district courts, complex tenure arrangements 
with the Gahrbeyya Governorate and missing information tying the workers’ 
housing fund to the flats. The Awqaf seems to have relied more on either a 
complacent or a complicit ARA which did not fully register the redistributed 
smallholdings in the 1960s, as well as exploiting the many layers of legislative 
amendments that govern land reform.
In all three cases, slow and long-acting indirect methods of eviction were 
used to weaken the communities as the legal cases were not strong. The Cairo 
Governorate has long banned the installation of water and waste water net-
works in the Ramla, citing it as an informal area.46 In the Mosta’mara, the 
MSWC has refused to repair old water piping that has polluted the drinking 
water, forcing residents to use a well that a charity built instead (Fig. 5).47 
In ‘Ezbet al-‘Arab farmers allege that the Awqaf filled in a canal as well as 
diverted raw sewage to a number of land parcels, ruining the existing crops 
and any chance of new crops growing.48 
When direct legal actions were not enough to evict the residents, mostly 
when residents were able to successfully challenge the cases in court, or when 
they physically resisted, and the indirect actions did not have the effect they 
wanted, the government agencies resorted to intimidation and violence, 
through accomplices from outside the agencies.
The Nile City towers adjacent to Ramlet Bulaq were the scene of a crime 
where a police officer stationed there shot and killed an unarmed resident of 
Ramlet Bulaq, inciting riots that ended in the mass arrest of fifty-one men 
from the area in a dawn raid.49 The court ruling annulling the expropriation 
order of Ramlet Bulaq cited a number of incidents that had been used since 
1997 to terrorize the Ramlet Bulaq residents into selling out to the corpora-
tion that owns the adjacent luxury towers for unfairly low prices.50 These 
included how no investigation was opened into the shooting and killing of 
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‘Amr al-Boni by the police officer, as well as a number of recorded complaints 
made against another officer based at the towers for kidnapping children from 
Ramlet Bulaq and framing them for crimes they did not commit, leading the 
court to conclude that the Cairo Governorate has been complicit with the 
tower owners in attempting to evict the residents and use the land for com-
mercial purposes.
In ‘Ezbet al-‘Arab the situation is just as dark. In 2009, Hassan Shindy, 
the leader of a cluster of families that protested the sale of their land by the 
Awqaf to a number of housing co-operatives set up by employees of state 
agencies, was found murdered in the fields, with a warning scribbled on his 
clothes.51 The Awqaf made EGP 100mn from selling the farmers’ plots from 
within the main Muthalath parcel and deeds found by lawyers investigating 
the case found out they were made to three housing co-operatives affiliated to 
the police.52 When even murder was not enough to terrorize the farmers off 
their land, the Awqaf is alleged to have rented out thugs to live in shacks on 
the land parcels and prevent the farmers from reopening the canal it had filled 
in to starve their crops.53
Conclusion: A Manufactured Informality
A pattern of methodical abuse, by the state and its agencies of legislation 
governing tenure, seems hard to ignore. The cases presented are but a sample 
Figure 5. Mosta’amara residents using a communal tap. Yahia Shawkat
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of this abuse, which when scaled up to the respective agencies’ reach would 
include a considerable portion of Egyptians. The Awqaf is landlord to 4,000 
villages and hamlets,54 or about 15% of Egypt’s rural communities where 
around 1.5mn families live. The ISDF has inventoried over 400 informal 
areas which are home to over 212,000 families, 120,000 of which are consid-
ered squatters on land owned by the state.55 The MSWC is one of almost 200 
public-sector companies that are up for privatization and many of these own 
or administer employee housing.
At the same time, the government has been further institutionalizing and 
developing its asset management tools in a bid to plug an ever increasing 
budget deficit. A central database of land administered by the various gov-
ernment agencies, showing size, location, and value is possibly complete by 
now, as are plans to benefit from this land, whether by selling it off or going 
into partnerships with private investors with an equity share equal to the 
value of the land. Either way whatever exists on that land will be removed to 
make way for these new investments. As an executive which has historically 
played a strong role in legislation,56 the government looks to be setting new 
precedents in exploiting land it administers, and expanding its domain, such 
as by reassigning once public state land to private state land.
The current legislature, one that is heavily influenced by big business,57 
will most probably support the government in selling off its assets – from 
the private investor’s perspective, seeking to accelerate privatisation. Indeed, 
another round of privatisation seems to be set in motion, with key business 
men set to benefit.58
This diabolical mix of interests makes it almost impossible to foresee any 
steps to recognize the informal tenure of millions of Egyptians with legally 
vague tenure. In fact there is every incentive to perpetuate, expand, and 
exploit the informal status.59 
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